The Supreme Court has made a strong pronouncement that its power to punish for contempt must not be used to shield judges from criticism or to suppress free speech. Instead, the Court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised with restraint, compassion, and a readiness to forgive when genuine remorse is shown.
⚖ What Happened — Case Background
The matter involved a woman, Vineeta Srinandan, who had issued a circular disparaging the judiciary as part of a dispute over stray-dog feeding restrictions in her housing society. The circular described judges as part of a “dog-mafia.” A court in the housing society’s jurisdiction had earlier ruled in favour of stray-dog feeders, prompting her circular.
On suo motu cognizance of the circular, the Bombay High Court (on its own motion) convicted her of criminal contempt and sentenced her to one week’s simple imprisonment.
✅ Supreme Court’s Decision & Reasoning
While acknowledging that the circular was contemptuous and capable of scandalising the court, the SC accepted the woman’s unconditional apology, which had been tendered at the earliest opportunity.
The Court held that under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — specifically section 12 — the power to punish carries with it a concomitant power to forgive. Where a contemnor shows sincere remorse and repents of the lapse, mercy must remain “an integral part of the judicial conscience.”
It stressed that the contempt jurisdiction is meant to protect the functioning and dignity of the court — not to act as a shield for judges’ personal sensitivities or as a weapon to stifle legitimate criticism.
The Court quashed the sentence imposed by the Bombay High Court, remitting the punishment in light of the remorse shown.
📚 Broader Principles & Implications
The judgment underscores that criticism of courts or their orders — even when sharp or harsh — cannot automatically attract contempt, unless it threatens the administration of justice or intends to obstruct judicial functioning. This aligns with past precedent: the right to fair and reasonable criticism of public acts, including those of judges, is recognised under the Constitution.
It reinforces the idea that judicial dignity and institutional respect are better maintained through reasoned judgments and consistent performance, rather than through the fear of penal consequences for dissenters. As one observation: judges cannot demand respect by the mere demonstration of power, but must earn it through their conduct and adjudications.
The case also sets a reminder that the courts’ discretion to forgive should be used where genuine apology and repentance are shown — promoting a balance between upholding the sanctity of courts, and protecting freedom of speech.
